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LIABILITY WAITING TO STRIKE: VIOLATION OF AN
EMPLOYEE'S PRIVACY THROUGH
DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
I. INTRODUCTION
Lurking all but unnoticed in the daily routine of California's pri-
vate employers is a common act which may inflict substantial cost with-
out warning. Some employers readily release an employee's personal
records without realizing that, in so doing, they may be violating that
individual's right of privacy.
With the elevation of privacy in California to the status of an ina-
lienable right' the tort of invasion of privacy has been greatly ex-
panded. The courts have already recognized causes of action for the
unauthorized disclosure of financial, medical and student records. Al-
though the area of employee records has not yet been addressed by the
judiciary,* it is probable that given the highly personal nature of infor-
mation in personnel files, these documents will also be accorded consti-
tutional protection, thereby imposing liability on offending employers.
This comment will explore the scope of the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy in California today, and will focus on its ramifications upon unaur
thorized disclosures by private2 employers. Situations where
compelling interests require the release of information will be dis-
cussed. Finally, this comment will analyze the movement toward fed-
eral legislation in the area of employee privacy.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Development of the Right to Ptivacy in California
1. The common law
Generally, the right to privacy has been left to the individual states
to define and protect.3 California, in adopting the common law ap-
1. Article I, section 1, of the California Constitution was amended in 1972 to include
privacy as an inalienable right. See note 15 infra for the text of the provision as it currently
reads.
* See PosTsciPaT infra.
2. The public sector is regulated in this area by legislation at both the federal and state
levels. Privacy Act of 1974, § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976); Information Practices Act of 1977,
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798-1798.76 (West Supp. 1981). Thus, this comment is restricted to the
potential liability of the private employer.
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967). The vast topic of privacy was
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proach, has recognized four separate invasions, 4 all of which encroach
upon the "right to be let alone."5
Of these four categories, public disclosure of private facts comes
closest to describing an individual's interest in preventing disclosure of
records containing personal information. A cause of action under this
theory requires three elements: 1) a public disclosure, 2) of private,
rather than public, facts, and 3) "the matter made public must be one
which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person."7
To be actionable under the common law, the offending disclosure
succinctly divided into three types in Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202, 207-08 (N.D. Cal.
1977). According to the Crain court, the first category involves the right of individuals to be
secure from unreasonable government searches and surveillance under the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The second category, which the district court re-
ferred to as the "right of selective disclosure," concerns one's right to determine when, how
and to what extent information about oneself is communicated to others. The final category,
which the court termed "the right of autonomy," encompasses the individual's freedom to
make certain kinds of important decisions. This type of privacy has been generally limited
by the courts to "'matters involving marriage, procreation, contraception and family rela-
tionships.'" .d. at 208 (citation omitted).
The Crain court recognized that privacy protection under the Federal Constitution is
available only with respect to the first and third categories. The court stated that: "In these
areas, the Constitution secures the right of privacy because that right is 'indispensable' to
some other Constitutional right [citations omitted]. The critical questions are whether and
how involuntary disclosure of private information affects the exercise of a right indepen-
dently secured by the Constitution." Id. at 209.
The second type of privacy, that involving selective disclosure, is largely a matter of
state tort law. Id. at 208. The Crain court suggested the possible applicability in this area of
the common law tort of public disclosure of private facts. Id. For a discussion of this tort,
see notes 6-14 infra and accompanying text.
4. The four torts recognized at common law were:
I) Intrusion upon one's seclusion or solitude. E.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d
245 (9th Cir. 1971) (defendant's employees photographed plaintiff in his office, and electron-
ically recorded and transmitted his conversations without his consent).
2) Public disclosure of private facts. E.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P.
91 (1931) (rehabilitated prostitute's past was revealed in a motion picture).
3) Placing one in a false light in the public eye. Eg., Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38
Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952) (plaintiff's photograph appeared in a magazine article about
love based on lust).
4) Appropriation of one's name or likeness. E.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy
Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955) (defendant circulated an advertisement
claiming that plaintiff was a satisfied user of defendant's product).
For a discussion of the development of these common law actions as well as their limi-
tations and defenses, see Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Prosser].
5. According to Prosser, this phrase, coined by Judge Cooley (COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d
ed. 1888)), has become accepted as representative of what is encompassed by the right of
privacy. Prosser, supra note 4, at 389.
6. Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. at 208.
7. Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 808-09, 608 P.2d 716, 725, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628,
637 (1980) (discussing the conflict between the freedom of the press and the right to privacy).
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has to be made to the public at large.8 A communication to an individ-
ual or to a small group is not protected.9 This requirement was ad-
dressed recently by a California court of appeal in Porten v. University
of San Francisco." Upon seeking admission as a transfer student to
the University of San Francisco (USF), the plaintiff furnished the
school with his grades from Columbia University. I He received assur-
ances that the transcripts would be used only for the purpose of evalu-
ating his application and would not be released to third parties without
his permission.12 Porten alleged that USF had disclosed his Columbia
grades to the State Scholarship and Loan Commission without his au-
thorization and that in doing so USF had invaded his privacy.' 3 The
court held that because such disclosure was neither to the public in
general nor to a large number of persons, Porten's complaint failed to
state a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts.14 Thus, the
common law protection for unauthorized disclosure continues to be
limited in scope by the size of the audience to whom the disclosure is
made. Under the common law, an unauthorized disclosure of em-
ployee records would only be actionable if such release were to the
general public or at least to a very large group of people.
2. Extension of the right to privacy in California
by constitutional amendment
The California Constitution was amended by the electorate in
1972 to include privacy as an inalienable right.1 5 The elevation of pri-
8. Prosser, supra note 4, at 393.
9. Id.
10. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
11. Id. at 827, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 828-29, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 841. However, Porten's complaint was found to state
a cause of action for invasion of privacy under the California Constitution. Id. at 832, 134
Cal. Rptr. at 843. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 38-40, infra.
15. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I currently reads: "All people are by nature free and in-
dependent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, andpivacy." (emphasis added).
The "moving force" behind this constitutional amendment was the advent of the com-
puter age. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105
(1975). According to the California Supreme Court, the primary purpose of the provision
was to protect the individual against increased surveillance and data collection by govern-
ment and business. Id. Quoting the language of the amendment's proponents as published
in the Proposed Amendments to Constitution, Propositions and Proposed Laws Together
With Arguments, at 26 (California Election Pamphlet, General Election (Tuesday, Nov. 7,
1972)) [hereinafter cited as Election Brochure], the White court stated that
1981]
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vacy to constitutional status has been viewed by the courts as an expan-
sion of the common law right.16 However, the scope of the amendment
has never been carefully delineated. 7
One of the "mischiefs"'" at which the amendment was directed
was "the improper use of information properly obtained for a specific
purpose, for example, the use of it for another purpose or the disclosure
of it to some third party." 19 Elaborating on the need for constitutional
protection in this area, proponents of the amendment stated:
'Fundamental to ourprivacy is the ability to control circula-
tion ofpersonal information. [Italics in original.] This is es-
sential to social relationships and personal freedom. The
proliferation of government and business records over which
we have no control limits our ability to control our personal
lives. Often we do not know that these records even exist and
we are certainly unable to determine who has access to
them.'20
The words quoted above evidence the voters' intent to protect in-
dividuals from privacy violations by private persons, as well as from
violations by the government. The courts have so interpreted the
amendment, holding that members of the private sector may be held
responsible for invasions of privacy.21 Additionally, the constitutional
"[c]omputerization of records makes it possible to create 'cradle-to-grave' profiles of every
American." 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105. The increasing use of
computers was also one of the reasons given by the California legislature for the enactment
of the Information Practices Act of 1977, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798-1798.76 (West Supp.
1981), which regulates employers in the public sector. See note 72 infra.
In White, the California Supreme Court recognized the propriety of relying on an elec-
tion brochure as the only legislative history available to aid in the interpretation of a consti-
tutional amendment adopted by the electorate. 13 Cal. 3d at 775 n.l 1, 533 P.2d at 234 n.11,
120 Cal. Rptr. at 106 n. 11. Thus, the voter's pamphlet is quoted extensively in White and in
Porten, as well as in other cases interpreting the privacy amendment.
16. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
As support for this proposition, the court in Porten, quoting the Election Brochure, supra
note 15, at 28, stated that "'[the right to privacy is much more than 'unnecessary wordage.'
It is fundamental to any free society. Privacy is not now guaranteed by our State Constitu-
tion. This simple amendment will extend various court decisions on privacy to insure protec-
tion of our basic rights."' Id. at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 841-42 (emphasis in original).
17. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656, 542 P.2d 977, 979,
125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555 (1975) ("[The amendment is new and its scope as yet is neither
carefully defined nor analysed by the courts. .. ").
18. The evils at which the amendment was aimed have been called "mischiefs" by the
courts because this was the term utilized in the election brochure.
19. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
20. Id. at 774, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Election Brochure, supra note 15, at 27).
21. E.g., Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
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provision is "self-executing"; 22 thus, no further legislative or judicial
action is necessary to secure what has become a legally enforceable
right.3
However, this constitutional right of privacy is not absolute. An
intrusion into one's privacy must be justified by a compelling interest.24
When an individual claims that his privacy has been invaded, the court
balances the individual's right to privacy against the interests of the
intruding party.' Thus, even if the constitutional right to privacy pro-
tects employee records, there are certain situations where a compelling
interest may require release of the information.26
B. Expansion of the Concept of Disclosure of Personal Facts
Based on the constitutional amendment, the courts have recog-
nized causes of action for the non-public disclosure of personal records
in three different contexts.27 In so doing, the courts have expanded the
common law tort of public disclosure of private facts. These cases pro-
vide examples of liability for nonconsensual release of data to an indi-
vidual or to a small group, rather than to the public. Careful analysis
of these cases indicates that a cause of action also exists for any unau-
thorized disclosure of employee records.
1. The recognition of a new cause of action
An individual has a cause of action under the constitutional
amendment when his reasonable expectation of privacy as to certain
842 ("Privacy is protected not merely against state action; it is considered an inalienable
right which may not be violated by anyone.").
22. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
23. Id.
24. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 657-58, 542 P.2d 977, 979-
80, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555-56 (1975) (focusing on the civil litigant's interest in seeking dis-
covery of relevant facts); Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App.
3d 669, 679-80, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (1979) (discussing the state's interest in the quality of
health and medical care received by its citizens).
25. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 657, 542 P.2d at 980, 125
Cal. Rptr. at 555. For further discussion of the balancing test, see text accompanying notes
77-86 infra.
26. See notes 75-89 infra and accompanying text.
27. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 553 (1975) (release of financial data); Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gher-
ardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1979) (hospital's obligations as custodian of
medical records); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1976) (disclosure of student records). For a detailed discussion of these cases, see notes
28-42 infra and accompanying text.
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information about himself has been violated.28 The determination that
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy rests upon the intimate na-
ture of the data.29 For example, in Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior
Court,3 0 the defendant sought, in connection with discovery, the plain-
tiff bank's loan records of several non-parties. The bank objected to
the disclosure, asserting that the information requested was confiden-
tial and that disclosure would violate its customers' rights of privacy.31
The court concluded that a person has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his banking records.
3 2
In Board ofMedical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini,3 the court of
appeal recognized an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in
his medical records. Gherardini involved an administrative subpoena
for the hospital records of five non-party patients. The hospital, assert-
ing the privacy rights of the absent patients, refused to surrender the
records. The court, comparing the situation before it to those in which
a right of privacy had already been acknowledged, 4 concluded that
"[a] person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely more inti-
mate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas [bank and
student records] already judicially recognized and protected."
3 Of
special concern to the court was the possibility of humiliating the pa-
tient upon disclosure of his ailments, as well as the fear that if medical
information were not protected, then patients would be reluctant to dis-
close fully their symptoms, thereby frustrating proper diagnosis and
28. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 832, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
29. Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 678, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 60.
30. 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
31. Id. at 655, 542 P.2d at 978, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
32. Id. at 656, 542 P.2d 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555. For this conclusion the court relied
on Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 243, 529 P.2d 590, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169
(1974), in which the California Supreme Court held that a bank's disclosure of financial data
received from a customer violated the California Constitutional provision against unreason-
able searches and seizures (CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13) because of the customer's reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information.
33. 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1979).
34. Id. at 678, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61. Among the privacy interests already recognized
were those in bank records (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542
P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590,
118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974)), student information (Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64
Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976)), medical, psychological and political histories
(Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 574 P.2d 766, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978)); and tele-
phone conversations (Tavernetti v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 187, 583 P.2d 737, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 883 (1978)).
35. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 678, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
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treatment.36 The Gherardini court held, therefore, that medical records
maintained by a hospital were within the species of protected informa-
tion.37 Valley Bank and Gherardini indicate that a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy may arise as to records which contain intimate and
personal information.
Porten v. University of San Francisco38 demonstrated that a reason-
able expectation of privacy may, alternatively, be founded upon an ex-
pression by the custodian of the records that such materials would
remain confidential. In Porten, USF had assured the plaintiff that his
Columbia University grades would be kept confidential and would not
be disclosed to third parties without his authorization.3 9 Without the
plaintiff's permission, USF released his grades to the state scholarship
and loan commission. The court in Porten did not discuss the personal
nature of student records. Instead, the court relied upon the promise of
confidentiality made to Porten.' Thus, a reasonable expectation of
privacy may be based either upon the personal nature of the informa-
tion, or upon expressions by the custodian that the data will be kept
confidential.
The concept of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" closely re-
sembles the common law element which requires the facts disclosed to
be offensive and objectionable to the average person.41 As is true at
common law, consent vitiates a claim of unauthorized disclosure of
personal records.42
There have been situations in which courts have refused to find an
actionable invasion of privacy. For example, in Stackler v. Department
36. Id. at 678-79, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
37. Id. at 679, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
38. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976). See text accompanying notes 4-14
supra for a discussion of why the common law afforded the plaintiff no cause of action in
this case.
39. Id. at 827, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
40. Id. at 832, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 843. Additional support for this concept appears in
Valley Bank, where the court noted that other jurisdictions have held that a bank impliedly
agrees not to divulge information without the customer's consent. 15 Cal. 3d at 657, 542
P.2d at 979, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 555 (citing First Nat'l Bank in Lenox v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d
178, 183 (Iowa 1970), in which the court recognized a bank's obligation not to disclose cus-
tomers' confidential affairs; Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d 759,
762 (Fla. App. 1969), where the court held that the plaintiff bank had an implied contractual
duty of confidentiality; 10 AM. JUR. 2d Banks § 332 (1963); Annot., 92 A.L.R. 2d 900
(1963)).
41. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
42. Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 678, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 60. The Gherardini court stated that the ability to control circulation of information
about oneself is essential to the right of privacy. Id.
1981]
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of Motor Vehicles,43 the plaintiff asserted that the presence of his pho-
tograph on a driver's license was an invasion of his privacy.'4 The
court held, however, that there can be no reasonable expectation of
privacy in that which is already public, in this case, his appearance. 4
Thus, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under the California
Constitution.' 6
Similarly, the plaintiff in Lehman v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco47 claimed an invasion of his privacy due to the disclosure by the
Jury Commissioner that he was a prospective juror.48 The court stated
that the appearance of one's name on a list of jurors revealed nothing
about the individual.49 Therefore, such a release was not of a personal
nature and could not support a claim of a reasonable expectation of
privacy." Thus, the courts have not recognized a cause of action where
the information disclosed is already public or where it reveals nothing
personal about the individual.
With this background as to the circumstances under which the
California courts have allowed an action for invasion of privacy, this
comment will now explore how the constitutional expansion of the
common law can affect the interests of the employee in his personnel
file.
2. Application of the tort to employee records
As the cases have demonstrated, for a cause of action to arise, it is
necessary that the individual have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the information disclosed. This expectation may be founded either
upon the nature of the information or upon expressions by its custodian
that the records will be kept confidential.
In applying these theories to employee records, it is useful to con-
sider what such records usually entail. An employee's personnel file is
a collection of many different types of data. It includes information
elicited from the employee himself, such as past employment, medical,
43. 105 Cal. App. 3d 240, 164 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1980).
44. Id. at 242, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
45. Id. at 247, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 207. The court also pointed out that the plaintiff main-
tained control over the license. Id. at 246, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
46. Id. at 248, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 207. This holding is a reaffirmation of the second ele-
ment of the common law tort of public disclosure of private facts. See note 7 supra and
accompanying text.
47. 80 Cal. App. 3d 309, 145 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1978).
48. Id. at 312, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
49. Id. at 313, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
50. Id.
[Vol. 14
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educational and family data. Additionally, it contains material col-
lected about the employee while at work: for example, payroll data,
job performance reports, documentation of medical problems and dis-
ciplinary actions. References, recommendations, psychological infor-
mation and comments on attitude may also find their way into
personnel files.51 It is this diverse variety and large quantum of infor-
mation which attracts information seekers to employee records.52
There are many similarities between personnel records and
financial and medical information. Like bank and hospital records, the
records held by an employer are a compilation of materials collected
from the individual himself and materials generated by the custodian
institution. Much of this data is not public. All three types of records
contain some information which individuals themselves do not readily
reveal to anyone other than intimate friends.53 Additionally, personnel
files contain some financial and medical data. Logically, if this infor-
mation is confidential within the confines of a bank or hospital, it
should also be protected elsewhere. In Valley Bank, the California
Supreme Court stated that "we may safely assume that the right of pri-
vacy extends to one's confidential financial affairs as well as to the de-
tails of one's personal life."54 Personnel files, which document a large
portion of an employee's life, fall within this latter category. Therefore,
like bank and medical records, personnel records should receive pro-
tection based upon their personal nature.
Information in employee records has, on several occasions, been
recognized as private. For example, in an address opening the public
hearings on workplace privacy, the Secretary of Labor classified the
employment relationship as "one of the largest sources of sensitive per-
sonal information about individuals available in the private sector.
' 55
The discussion of the appellate court in Board of Trustees v.
51. Comment, Employee Privacy Rights: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 157
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Proposal]; Westin, Privacy and Personnel Records: A Look at
Employee Attitudes, 4 Civ. LIB. REV. 28, 31 (Jan./Feb. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Attitude
Survey]. Thus, employee records may include medical, financial and educational informa-
tion, which the California courts have already declared within the protected confines of the
privacy right. See notes 28-42 supra and accompanying text.
52. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY CoMMIssIoN, EMPLOYMENT RECORDS 1 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as EMPLOYMENT RECORDS].
53. For example, many employee records contain information about salaries, account
balances and medical history.
54. 15 Cal. 3d at 656, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
55. Address of Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor hearings
on Workplace Privacy (Jan. 7, 1980).
1981]
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Leach56 is also instructive as to the confidential nature of employee
records. In Leach, the court stated that
it is common knowledge that such matters [employee person-
nel files] are among the most confidential and sensitive
records kept by a private or public employer, and their use
remains effective only so long as the confidence of the records,
and the confidences of those who contribute to those records,
are maintained. 7
Based on this need to protect the privacy of this information, the court
held that the employee records of a school district were not subject to
grand jury inspection when no investigation of willful or corrupt mis-
conduct was pending.5
The court's characterization of personnel records as sensitive was
echoed by employees themselves in a survey of their attitudes toward
information compiled by employers.5 9 Fifty-five percent of those re-
sponding considered the privacy of their records to be "very impor-
tant."6 An overwhelming ninety percent felt that they should be
notified by their employer before any personal data was released to
anyone outside the company.6' Thus, this survey indicates strong feel-
ings on the part of the responding employees as to the privacy of their
personnel records.
Finally, the California legislature has also acted to protect em-
ployee rights, thus showing that it, too, recognizes the importance to the
employee of personnel information. Section 1198.5 of the California
Labor Code requires employers to permit employees upon request to
inspect personnel files, when such files are to be used to determine that
employee's qualifications for employment, promotion, additional com-
pensation or disciplinary action.6" California is one of only two states
56. 258 Cal. App. 2d 281, 65 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1968). Leach was decided four years before
privacy was recognized as an inalienable right under the California Constitution.
57. Id. at 288, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
58. Id. The court held that CAL. PENAL CODE § 933.5 (West 1978), which authorized
the grand jury to examine books and records of a special purpose taxing district, was not
broad enough to allow such an investigation.
59. Attitude Survey, supra note 51. Unfortunately, the sampling covered only an infini-
tesimal fraction of the national work force. The number responding to the questionnaire
was only 240 out of the 750 to whom copies were mailed. Perhaps a more comprehensive
study will be undertaken in the future.
60. Id. at 30.
61. Id. at 32. The Attitude Survey discusses many issues of employee rights not ad-
dressed in this comment. They include the use of polygraphs by employers, intrusive ques-
tioning into non-work matters, and misuse of information within the company.
62. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West 1979), which reads:
[Vol. 14
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with such an inspection statute.63
The legislature also enacted the Information Practices Act of
1977,64 governing information held by public agencies within the state.
This Act details protections to be given to "personal information."
6
The statute sets forth notification,66 maintenance,67 disclosure,68 and
access69 requirements. It also authorizes civil70 and criminal7 penalties
for violations of its terms. In spite of its limited applicability, this statu-
tory scheme evidences the importance the state legislature has placed
on the protection of personal information,72 including that which con-
cerns employment.
Aside from the personal nature of employee records, an individual
may also have a reasonable expectation of privacy based upon repre-
sentations of confidentiality made by his employer. InPorten, express
assurances by the defendant gave rise to a cause of action for violation
Every employer shall at reasonable times, and at reasonable intervals as deter-
mined by the Labor Commissioner, upon the request of an employee, permit that
employee to inspect such personnel files which are used or have been used to deter-
mine that employee's qualifications for employment, promotion, additional com-
pensation, or termination or other disciplinary action.
Each employer subject to this section shall keep a copy of each employee's
personnel file at the place the employee reports to work, or shall make such file
available at such place within a reasonable period of time after a request therefor
by the employee.
This section does not apply to the records of an employee relating to the inves-
tigation of a possible criminal offense. It shall not apply to letters of reference.
63. Maine is the other state with an inspection statute. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY
COMMISSION, PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATES 17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY LAW].
64. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (West Supp. 1981).
65. "'[Plersonal information' means any information in any record about an individual
that is maintained by [a public] agency, including, but not limited to, his or her education,
financial transactions, medical or employment history." Id. § 1798.3(b). Of these four cate-
gories, only employment records have not yet been considered and protected by the courts in
the private sector as well. See notes 28-40 supra and accompanying text.
66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.9-.10 (West Supp. 1981).
67. Id. § 1798.14 - .23.
68. Id. § 1798.24 - .28.
69. Id. § 1798.30 - .43.
70. Id. § 1798.45 - .53.
71. Id. § 1798.56.
72. The following findings of the legislature support this conclusion:
(a) The right to privacy is being threatened by the indiscriminate collection,
maintenance, and dissemination of personal information and the lack of effective
laws and legal remedies.
(b) The increasing use of computers and other sophisticated information technol-
ogy has greatly magnified the potential risk to individual privacy that -can occur
from the maintenance of personal information.
(c) In order to protect the privacy of individuals, it is necessary that the mainte-
nance and dissemination of personal information be subject to strict limits.
Id. § 1798.1.
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of the plaintiffs privacy. 3 Similarly, if an employer informs an em-
ployee that his records will be confidential and will not be disclosed to
third parties, failure to live up to this promise should be an actionable
violation of the employer's privacy.
Comparison of employee records with those types of information
already protected by the constitutional privacy right indicates that simi-
lar treatment will probably be afforded to personnel records. Adding
support to this projection are the two recent legislative enactments
which further employee rights in similar ways.74 An employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his personnel file and a violation
of this privacy expectation should give rise to a cause of action under
the California Constitution.
C. Balancing Privacy Rights with Compelling Interests
In spite of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in his per-
sonal records, such records do not enjoy absolute protection under the
California Constitution.7- Even the proponents of the privacy amend-
ment recognized that there would be situations where the release of
confidential information might be required by a compelling public in-
terest.76 When such a reason exists, the court must balance the need for
disclosure against the individual's right to privacy.77
In the context of discovery, for example, where a demand for the
release of confidential information is likely to arise, the state has a well-
recognized interest in facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connec-
tion with legal proceedings. 78 Generally, information is discoverable if
it is unprivileged and relevant to the subject matter of the action.79
73. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
74. See notes 62-72 supra and accompanying text.
75. Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 680, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 61.
76. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (quoting the
Election Brochure, supra note 15, at 27: "'This right should be abridged only when there is
a compelling public need.' ").
77. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 657, 542 P.2d at 979, 125
Cal. Rptr. at 555.
78. Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 904, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213 (1979)
(paternity suit defendant, through interrogatories, sought names and addresses of all of the
mother's sexual partners).
79. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2031 (West Supp. 1981), which reads in pertinent part:
(a) Any party may serve on any other party a request (I) to identify such docu-
ments, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, of a
category specified with reasonable particularity in the request, which are relevant
to the subject matter of the action, or are reasonably calculated to discover admissi-
ble evidence relating to any matters within the scope of the examination permitted
by subdivision (b) of Section 2016 of this code [protecting privileged information)
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Relevancy is liberally interpreted in discovery. 0 Thus, in the discovery
context, an employer may find himself faced with confficting obliga-
tions: the duty of confidentiality to his employee and an obligation to
respond to a discovery request which may be compelled by a court of
law.
An analogous situation existed in Valley Bank, where the loan
records of several non-parties were sought from the plaintiff financial
institution.81 The bank objected to the disclosure, claiming the confi-
dentiality of the data, and sought a protective order.82 Thus, the bank
called upon the court to balance the right of the civil litigants to dis-
cover relevant facts against the right of the bank customers to maintain
privacy in their financial affairs.83
The Valley Bank court found that "despite the exclusivity of the
[California] Evidence Code 4 on the subject of privileges and the ab-
and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the party upon whom the
request is served, and to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing of the same, by or on behalf of the party making the request ....
See also Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 655, 542 P.2d at 978, 125
Cal. Rptr. at 554. There are some statutory privileges protecting certain kinds of informa-
tion. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 900-1070 (West Supp. 1981). While no such privilege covers the
employer-employee relationship, CAL. EvID. CODE § 1043 (West Supp. 1981) provides spe-
cific procedures for the disclosure of peace officer personnel records.
80. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 656, 542 P.2d at 978, 125
Cal. Rptr. at 554.
81. Id. at 655, 542 P.2d at 978, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
82. Id. A protective order is a flexible, discretionary tool through which the court may
restrict the scope and/or manner of discovery, thereby protecting a party or witness from
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1) (West Supp.
1981) reads, in pertinent part:
Upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined or
notified to produce books, documents, or other things and upon notice, or upon the
court's own motion and after giving counsel an opportunity to be heard, and in
either case for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may
make an order. . . that certain matters shall not be inquired into, or that the scope
of the examination shall be limited to certain matters, books, documents, or other
things, or that the examination shall be held with no one present except the parties
to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition
shall be opened only by order of the court, or that secret processes, developments,
or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall simultaneously file speci-
fied documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as di-
rected by the court; or the court may make any other order which justice requires
to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.
83. 15 Cal. 3d at 657, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
84. "It is clear that the privileges contained in the Evidence Code are exclusive and the
courts are not free to create new privileges as a matter of judicial policy." Id. at 656, 542
P.2d at 978-79, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55 (emphasis in original). See CAL. EvID. CODE § 911
(West 1966), which reads, in pertinent part, that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute
(b) No person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter or to refuse to produce
any writing, object or other thing."
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sence of either a common law or statutory authority, overriding consti-
tutional considerations may exist which impel us to recognize some
limited form of protection for confidential information ... *"85 The
court concluded that before disclosing confidential customer informa-
tion, the bank was obligated to notify the customer to allow him to take
steps to protect his own privacy interests.86 In so deciding, the court
reasoned that "[tihe protection of such right should not be left entirely
to the election of third persons who may have their own personal rea-
sons for permitting or resisting disclosure of confidential information
received from others. 87
In sending the action back to the trial court for a proper balancing
of the interests involved, the supreme court suggested several procedu-
ral devices which would be useful in the fashioning of an appropriate
protective order through which disclosure could be accomplished while
confidentiality was preserved.88 These devices include deleting the cus-
tomer's name, sealing the data until further order of the court, and
holding in camera hearings.89 Thus, through a properly drafted protec-
tive order, the court suggested a way to compromise between the con-
flicting interests of discovery and privacy.
Therefore, when an employer is confronted with a discovery re-
quest for confidential information, he should seek a protective order
asserting his employee's right of privacy. Additionally, the employee
should be notified so he may personally assert his interests. Through
the flexibility of a court fashioned protective order, it is possible to
reach a compromise whereby discovery is allowed with only minimal
intrusion into the employee's privacy.
85. 15 Cal. 3d at 656, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555. The court was referring
specifically to the amendment to article I, section 1.
86. "[Tmhe bank must take reasonable steps to notify its customer of the pendency and
nature of the proceedings and to afford the customer a fair opportunity to assert his interests
by objecting to disclosure, by seeking an appropriate protective order, or by instituting other
legal proceedings to limit the scope or nature of the matters sought to be discovered." .d. at
658, 542 P.2d at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
87. Id. at 657, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
88. Id. at 658, 542 P.2d at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
89. Id In camera hearings make disclosure possible but restrict the audience exposed to
the release of information. Another way to frame an effective protective order is by restrict-
ing disclosure to counsel only. See Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 272,
150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (1978) (a party upon request was presumptively entitled to a protective
order when financial information was sought for the purposes of determining punitive dam-
ages).
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D. The Possibility of Future Federal Legislation
California is one of only nine states which has an explicit constitu-
tional provision protecting the right to privacy.9" California has also
been a forerunner in employee rights, statutorily providing both an em-
ployee's right to inspect his own personnel file9 and an entire set of
procedures protecting personal information which is gathered by state
agencies.92 However, a private employee in other states is left virtually
unprotected.93 It is this void which has stimulated federal legislative
attempts and investigative hearings in this area.
Early in 1980, the Department of Labor held public hearings on
workplace privacy. The purpose of the investigation was to evaluate
and find ways to accelerate the adoption by private employers of the
policies and practices set forth by the Privacy Protection Study Com-
mission (Commission) in 1977.9' The Commission was created pursu-
ant to the Privacy Act of 197495 to examine individual privacy rights in
many institutional contexts, including employment. 96 After extensive
hearings, the Commission delineated the obligations of an employer to
protect employees' privacy, but ultimately opted for voluntary adoption
of the Privacy Act's principles by private employers.97 Thus, direct
statutory controls were rejected. There were two reasons for such a
voluntary plan.98 The first was the desire to avoid the massive and
90. PRIVACY LAWv, supra note 63, at 1. The other states are Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina and Washington.
91. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West Supp. 1981). Only Maine has a similar statute.
PRIVACY LAW, supra note 63, at 17.
92. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798-1798.76 (West Supp. 1981).
93. Proposal, supra note 51, at 156.
94. 44 Fed. Reg. 57537 (1979). The findings of the Labor Department hearings have not
yet been published. For an unofficial reporting of a portion of the proceedings, see Hen-
dricks, Labor Dept. Ends Hearings on Workplace Privacy, 3 ACCESS REPORTS 7 (March 25,
1980).
95. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976). The Privacy Act of 1974, much like the Information Prac-
tices Act of 1978 in California (CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (West 1977)), controls the process of
collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of information by agencies of the federal
government. House Bill 1984 in 1975 was designed to extend the protection of the Privacy
Act of 1974 to the private sector. H.R. 1984, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975). It was never
enacted, however, due to its poor drafting, along with the compliance problems which some
anticipated that it would create. For an in-depth discussion of H.R. 1984 and its shortcom-
ings, see Comment, Let Industry Beware: A Survey ofPrivacy Legislation and its Potential
Inpact on Business, 11 TULSA L.J. 68, 76-81 (1975).
96. 44 Fed. Reg. 57537 (1979).
97. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMA-
TION SOCIETY 274 (1977) (hereinafter cited as PRIVACY REPORT). Besides the employment
relationship, the report considered, among other things, privacy as it affected consumer
credit, mailing lists, medical care, investment reporting, insurance and taxes.
98. EMPLOYMENT RECORDS, supra note 52, at 33.
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unwieldy government program which would be required to administer
a statutory approach.99 The second was the Commission's reluctance
to change drastically the character of the employee-employer relation-
ship by interjecting governmental requirements. 100
The Commission did recommend that employers voluntarily as-
sume a duty of confidentiality to each employee, former employee and
applicant about whom they had collected information.101 This obliga-
tion, as outlined by the Commission, would require the prohibition of
external disclosure without the individual's explicit authorization. 0 2
Exceptions to this general rule include release of directory informa-
tion'0 3 and disclosure for law enforcement purposes. However, the em-
ployee must be put on notice as to these special types of disclosures.'°4
It is compliance with this voluntary model for private employers
with which the Department of Labor hearing dealt. By providing this
public forum, the Department refocused attention on employee privacy
rights. The voluntary movement in the direction of privacy protection
may be accelerated by such action. However, it seems doubtful that
legislation will be generated from this renewed interest because of the
two reasons such legislation has been rejected in the past: the reluc-
tance to create a new large-scale government program and to change
dramatically the character of the employee-employer relationship. 05
An additional factor is the movement, espoused by the Reagan Admin-
istration, favoring less government regulation of private enterprise.
However, a simple federal statute, patterned after the California Con-
stitutional amendment asserting the individual's right to privacy in per-
sonal records, would provide protection without the necessity of
administrative red tape. By authorizing a cause of action by those
whose right of privacy has been infringed, the Congress could leave the
policing of private employers to the employees involved.
III. CONCLUSION
The common law tort of public disclosure of private facts is lim-
99. Id. The Commission was concerned with the great number of records to be re-
viewed, as well as the variety of records used by different employers.
100. Id. The Commission did not feel competent to evaluate the possible effects of this
type of government intervention.
101. PRIVACY RiEPORT, supra note 97, at 270-73.
102. Id.
103. Directory information is 1) the fact of past or present employment, 2) dates of em-
ployment, 3) title or position, 4) wage or salary, and 5) location of job site. Id. at 272.
104. Id. at 270.
105. EMPLOYMENT REcoRDs, supra note 52, at 33.
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ited in its application because of the requirement that the disclosure be
made to the public. The elevation of a privacy right to the status of an
inalienable right in California, by amendment to the state constitution,
has expanded this cause of action, making actionable unauthorized dis-
closures to individuals and to small groups. Protection under the con-
stitutional amendment is based on one's reasonable expectation of
privacy in records which pertain to him. Thus far, the courts have
found such an expectation in the personal nature of financial and medi-
cal records. Based upon the intimate nature of employee information,
it is probable that employee records, too, will be constitutionally pro-
tected from unauthorized disclosure. The courts have not yet had the
opportunity to address this issue.*
If an expectation of privacy exists in employee records, it is incum-
bent upon employers to protect the confidentiality of such data. Court
protective orders are effective tools. Additionally, the employer may
have the duty to notify his employee of any pending hearing on the
disclosure of his records so that the employee may personally protect
his privacy rights.
Although California, through its constitution and various statutes,
recognizes some employee rights, other states are not as progressive.
Thus, there has been a movement at the federal level to provide privacy
protection. Recently, the Department of Labor held hearings on this
subject. However, federal action will probably only amount to public
exposure of the problems, as opposed to legislation, due to the large
bureaucracy that might be needed to administer a statutory scheme.
Therefore, private employees in California will continue to enjoy pri-
vacy protections that their counterparts in most other states do not
share.
Michele Patterson Ahrens
* See POSTSCRIPT infra.
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POSTSCRIPT
While this comment was being printed, a California court for the
first time addressed the issue of whether the right of privacy protects
employee records from unauthorized disclosure. In Board of Trustees v.
Superior Court,' the appellate court sought to reconcile the strong pub-
lic policy in favor of discovery with California's constitutionally-con-
firmed inalienable right to privacy.2 The court's analysis and
conclusions confirm the premise of this comment. Personnel informa-
tion is protected from unauthorized disclosure by the state constitution.
The Board of Trustees case arose from a feud between two faculty
members at Stanford University's School of Medicine. Dr. Eugene
Dong and Dr. Zoltan Lucas charged each other with research miscon-
duct which led to University investigations of both men. Although
never disciplined, Dr. Dong brought suit against the University, several
University officials and Dr. Lucas, claiming that he had been defamed.3
During discovery, he sought: 1) the personnel, tenure, and promotion
files of Dr. Lucas, 2) all documents with respect to Dr. Lucas' research,
3) all documents utilized in, and giving the conclusion of, the commit-
tee investigating him, and 4) his personnel, tenure and promotion file.
4
The superior court ordered the release of all data requested except let-
ters of reference written at the time Dr. Dong was hired.5 The Univer-
sity petitioned the appellate court for an extraordinary writ of mandate,
annulling the lower court order.6
Thus, the appellate court was faced with the conflict7 between the
state's interest in discovery versus a non-party's right to privacy in his
employment records. Board of Trustees illustrates the point that an
employer has the duty to resist an attempt to compel production of
personal documents within his control.' "[Tihe custodian of such pri-
vate information may not waive the privacy rights of persons who are
constitutionally guaranteed their protection." 9
Approaching the four requests one-by-one, the court first dis-
cussed Dr. Lucas' personnel, tenure, and promotion files. The court
1. 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1981).
2. Id. at 552, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 162. See discussion in text accompanying notes 75-85
supra.
3. Id. at 552-53, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
4. Id. at 524, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See text accompanying notes 78-85 supra.
8. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
9. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
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found the documents were private to Dr. Lucas and were maintained in
confidence by the University.10 No direct relevance to the issue of def-
amation was found." More significant, because of the guidance it will
give future tribunals, is the court's belief that even if the records were
directly relevant, "a proper balancing of competing values would here
necessarily weigh in favor of Dr. Lucas' right of privacy."'12 The same
conclusion was reached for the group of documents relating to the
medical research of Dr. Lucas.1 3 The third category, materials used by
the committee in the investigation of Dr. Dong, was found to have been
gathered under a University policy which guaranteed confidentiality.14
They were also deemed not directly relevant to Dr. Dong's defamation
action. 15 Thus, none of the requested information in the first three
groups was deemed discoverable.
Lastly, the court considered the interesting question of whether
Dr. Dong should be able to compel production of his own personnel
file. The focus of the examination was on the letters of reference which
the lower court excluded from its discovery order. Again, the appellate
court reiterated the University policy of confidentiality with respect to
faculty peer evaluation to enhance candor and honesty.'6 Note was
taken of section 1198.5 of the California Labor Code which gives an
employee access to his own personnel fie with the exception of "letters
of reference."' 7 The lower court had held this to mean only documents
used in the initial hiring of Dr. Dong. i8 Feeling the need to interpret
the phrase, the court determined that the "manifest purpose" of the
section was "to insure privacy of all furnishers of confidential informa-
tion used to determine an 'employee's qualifications for employment,
promotion, additional compensation, or termination or other discipli-
nary action."'"9 However, no compelling purpose was seen in the
maintenance of the contents of the letters of reference, just the identifi-
cation of the authors.20 Thus, the court suggests disclosure with dele-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 526-27, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
14. Id. at 527, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 165-66.
15. Id. at 527, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
16. Id. at 528, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
17. Id. at 530, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 167. For the text of CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5, see note
62 supra.
18. Id. at 530, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
19. Id. at 531, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West Supp.
1981)).
20. Id. at 532, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
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tion of names and other identifying data in order to safeguard
privacy.21 This is another example of the use of protective orders, as
discussed in the comment.22
Thus, the analysis and conclusions of this comment have rapidly,
even before publication, been confirmed. Board of Trustees is judicial
recognition that employee records are protected from unauthorized re-
lease by the California Constitution. The law now clearly imposes the
duty on employers to keep personnel files confidential. Failure to do so
will surely provide grounds for a liability action.
21. Id.
22. See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra. See also note 82 supra for the statutory
provision for protective orders.
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